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Milestones

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Since 2001, the date ‘9/11’ (September 11) remembers to sad events in the US.

However, Germany has also its ‘9/11’, but written ‘continental’ style (November 9). It is called ‘Schicksaltag’ (Day of fate), because of several historical events :

1849 : end of the crushed liberal revolution in the German states.
1918 : beginning of the revolution against the Kaiser (end of World War I).
1923 : Hitler’s Burgerbraukeller Putch in Munich
1938 : Reichskristallnacht
1989 : Fall of the Berlin Wall
 
Ninety years ago today, on 9 November 1932, Nadezhda Alliluyeva shot herself in the Kremlin.

'If you're in a bad marriage, don't try to mend it -- end it.'

With Joseph Stalin for husband, her options were necessarily limited.
Shooting her husband could have been an option too! For her, it would not have made much difference, probably, but for the rest of the world….
 
Since 2001, the date ‘9/11’ (September 11) remembers to sad events in the US.

However, Germany has also its ‘9/11’, but written ‘continental’ style (November 9). It is called ‘Schicksaltag’ (Day of fate), because of several historical events :

1849 : end of the crushed liberal revolution in the German states.
1918 : beginning of the revolution against the Kaiser (end of World War I).
1923 : Hitler’s Burgerbraukeller Putch in Munich
1938 : Reichskristallnacht
1989 : Fall of the Berlin Wall
KFC made the most stomach-turning (in all senses) suggestion for 'celebrating' Kristallnacht:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63499057

Where depending on Artificial Intelligence gets us.
 
KFC made the most stomach-turning (in all senses) suggestion for 'celebrating' Kristallnacht:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63499057

Where depending on Artificial Intelligence gets us.

There's no AI there, purely automation. This is where automation gets us, especially if it lacks sophistication. Give the system a calendar and tell it to send advertising on every day marked as nationally important. How can that possibly go wrong?

AI would be examining customers' data and working out what to send them on what days.
 
There's no AI there, purely automation. This is where automation gets us, especially if it lacks sophistication. Give the system a calendar and tell it to send advertising on every day marked as nationally important. How can that possibly go wrong?

AI would be examining customers' data and working out what to send them on what days.
well, not much intelligence, apparently a bot that targetted Germans who've got the KFC app.
 
104 years ago today the western front in WWI Europe went silent. It was the beginning of the end of that horrific bloodbath, but unfortunately it would not be the last.
Known as Armistice Day, it is still observed today. Here in the US it's called Veterans Day.
 
104 years ago today the western front in WWI Europe went silent. It was the beginning of the end of that horrific bloodbath, but unfortunately it would not be the last.
Known as Armistice Day, it is still observed today. Here in the US it's called Veterans Day.
It was the end, in fact! The beginning of the end was August 8th 1918 , when the German lines collapsed under an Allied offensive! The next 100 day.s, they. would keep on retiring.
 
It was the end, in fact! The beginning of the end was August 8th 1918 , when the German lines collapsed under an Allied offensive! The next 100 day.s, they. would keep on retiring.
Yes, and I understand there was continued fighting in other parts of the world for a short time after the armistice was signed.
 
In looking back on 80 years ago events in WWII, November 1942 was a very crucial time. From 3 to 7 November 1942, British 8th Army broke trough the lines of Rommel’s Afrika Korps in the second Battle of El-Alamein, and drove it back (Churchill : “This is not the end, this is not even the beginning of the end, but perhaps, this is the end of the beginning”).

On November 8th , Allied forces landed in French North Africa, a first step to create a second front in Europe (Operation Torch). Diplomatically, this was a delicate operation. First of all, all troops, including British, would wear American uniforms, first of all to avoid the perception that Britain was invading French colonies and territory. Secondly, because the French had not yet forgotten Mers-El-Kebir, two years before, when British Navy had opened fire on the French fleet, killing about 1200 sailors (‘France’s Pearl Harbour’). Actually, the Allied leaders hoped to come to an agreement and persuade the French Vichy troops to change sides.

Therefore, the Allies needed a French authority. De Gaulle was ignored, the Allies preferred General Giraud. But the French in North Africa did not accept Giraud’s command, since he only represented himself. Then came a ‘coup de théatre’! Coincidentally, Admiral Darlan, commander of the Vichy French army, was present in Algiers. A notorious high ranked collaborator, he had been long time the #2 of the Vichy regime, after Pétain. But in exchange for keeping command of French forces in North Africa, he accepted to order his troops to cease fire. This ‘Darlan Deal’ was politically highly criticized in Britain and the US, but it made Torch succeed with minimal Allied casualties.

As a reaction against the events in French North Africa, Hitler ordered to invade the ‘free’ Vichy zone, culminating on November 27 with the scuttling of the French fleet in Toulon, to prevent the Germans from seizing it.
 
In looking back on 80 years ago events in WWII, November 1942 was a very crucial time. From 3 to 7 November 1942, British 8th Army broke trough the lines of Rommel’s Afrika Korps in the second Battle of El-Alamein, and drove it back (Churchill : “This is not the end, this is not even the beginning of the end, but perhaps, this is the end of the beginning”).

On November 8th , Allied forces landed in French North Africa, a first step to create a second front in Europe (Operation Torch). Diplomatically, this was a delicate operation. First of all, all troops, including British, would wear American uniforms, first of all to avoid the perception that Britain was invading French colonies and territory. Secondly, because the French had not yet forgotten Mers-El-Kebir, two years before, when British Navy had opened fire on the French fleet, killing about 1200 sailors (‘France’s Pearl Harbour’). Actually, the Allied leaders hoped to come to an agreement and persuade the French Vichy troops to change sides.

Therefore, the Allies needed a French authority. De Gaulle was ignored, the Allies preferred General Giraud. But the French in North Africa did not accept Giraud’s command, since he only represented himself. Then came a ‘coup de théatre’! Coincidentally, Admiral Darlan, commander of the Vichy French army, was present in Algiers. A notorious high ranked collaborator, he had been long time the #2 of the Vichy regime, after Pétain. But in exchange for keeping command of French forces in North Africa, he accepted to order his troops to cease fire. This ‘Darlan Deal’ was politically highly criticized in Britain and the US, but it made Torch succeed with minimal Allied casualties.

As a reaction against the events in French North Africa, Hitler ordered to invade the ‘free’ Vichy zone, culminating on November 27 with the scuttling of the French fleet in Toulon, to prevent the Germans from seizing it.
I’m sure Hitler was delighted when he heard about it! :doh: luckily German swear words can be satisfyingly long :p
 
In looking back on 80 years ago events in WWII, November 1942 was a very crucial time. From 3 to 7 November 1942, British 8th Army broke trough the lines of Rommel’s Afrika Korps in the second Battle of El-Alamein, and drove it back (Churchill : “This is not the end, this is not even the beginning of the end, but perhaps, this is the end of the beginning”).

On November 8th , Allied forces landed in French North Africa, a first step to create a second front in Europe (Operation Torch). Diplomatically, this was a delicate operation. First of all, all troops, including British, would wear American uniforms, first of all to avoid the perception that Britain was invading French colonies and territory. Secondly, because the French had not yet forgotten Mers-El-Kebir, two years before, when British Navy had opened fire on the French fleet, killing about 1200 sailors (‘France’s Pearl Harbour’). Actually, the Allied leaders hoped to come to an agreement and persuade the French Vichy troops to change sides.

Therefore, the Allies needed a French authority. De Gaulle was ignored, the Allies preferred General Giraud. But the French in North Africa did not accept Giraud’s command, since he only represented himself. Then came a ‘coup de théatre’! Coincidentally, Admiral Darlan, commander of the Vichy French army, was present in Algiers. A notorious high ranked collaborator, he had been long time the #2 of the Vichy regime, after Pétain. But in exchange for keeping command of French forces in North Africa, he accepted to order his troops to cease fire. This ‘Darlan Deal’ was politically highly criticized in Britain and the US, but it made Torch succeed with minimal Allied casualties.

As a reaction against the events in French North Africa, Hitler ordered to invade the ‘free’ Vichy zone, culminating on November 27 with the scuttling of the French fleet in Toulon, to prevent the Germans from seizing it.
I've long been an avid fan of WWII history, and your knowledge of the subject is impressive. I always enjoy reading your posts on the subject.
 
Like emphasized earlier, November 1942 was a very crucial time in WWII.

On November 19th 1942, the Red Army started Operation Uranus, on both flanks of the German 6th Army, besieging Stalingrad. During September and October, 6th Army had done hard fighting to control the city , with house to house street fighting and incurring heavy losses on both sides.

At the time, Red Army front in Stalingrad was reduced to two separate bridgeheads, fighting with the Wolga in their back. But due to the concentration of troops in Stalingrad, the adjacent German front, over a large stretch was rather weak. The goal of the offensive had been to install a defence line along the River Don, protecting the real target of Case Blue, seizing oilfields across the Caucasus, an operation that had meanwhile nearly stalled. Concentrating on Stalingrad had been no part of the original plan.

Apart from the length of the frontline, there were two other weaknesses. During their fast drive east in summer, the 6th Army had often ignored to eliminate pockets of Soviet troops on their side of the Don, leaving the latter useful bridgeheads for a counteroffensive. Secondly, the flanks of the 6th Army were defended by Romanian and Italian troops, which were much less trained, armed and motivated than the Germans. German high command had warned Hitler about this dangerous situation, but he had ignored it, being convinced as he was that the Red Army was finished.

With Operation Uranus, the Red Army easily broke through these weak flanks and encircled the 6th Army. It completely surprised the latter’s commander, General Paulus, who, ironically, found himself and his staff outside of the cauldron. Paulus suggested an immediate breakout, but Hitler ordered him to stay at the Wolga. The encircled army would be supplied by airlift, and a relief force would be sent.

But being encircled meant that 6th Army had to make front on all its sides and hence retreat deeper into the cauldron, lengthening the distance, the relief force would have to make its way. It took three weeks to assemble the relief force, commanded by General Manstein, giving of course the Red Army time to reenforce the encirclement.

Manstein’s offensive started with a difficult choice! Taking the shortest route seemed logic, but that meant he would have to cross the River Don. To avoid that, he had to start from no less than 100 km further away from Stalingrad. He choose the latter option. Initially, he advanced swiftly. The encircled troops heard (and saw at night) the rumble of the relief force nearing. But at the end of December, it became clear for Manstein, that he was running out of means, against a stronger force, and he would not make it. He had meanwhile approached the cauldron only 45 kilometers. So, Manstein suggested Paulus to ignore Hitler’s orders, and try to break out from the encirclement, to make contact with the relief force.

Now Paulus had a dilemma, he considered, and concluded that a), he had only resources and fuel for some 15 kilometers, so he feared to end up in the open plains, amidst the harsh Russian winter; b) while inside Stalingrad, the ruins offered at least some protection against the weather; c) he would have to abandon positions that had cost a high sacrifice to capture them, and d) he would have to abandon the wounded. So Paulus said it could not be done. Manstein then turned to Hitler, who did not veto the proposal, but consulted Paulus, who repeated he did not have the resources for a 45 km breakout. So, Hitler informed Manstein that 6th Army was not capable to put up a breakout. Manstein was soon forced to retire.

Meanwhile, the promised airlift never managed to supply the needs of the encircled army. Nevertheless, the 6th Army, despite starvation, cold and disease, kept on fighting, a resistance that allowed the troops from the also failed Caucasus campaign, to retire safely during January. On January 31st 1943, 6th Army surrendered.
 
Like emphasized earlier, November 1942 was a very crucial time in WWII.

On November 19th 1942, the Red Army started Operation Uranus, on both flanks of the German 6th Army, besieging Stalingrad. During September and October, 6th Army had done hard fighting to control the city , with house to house street fighting and incurring heavy losses on both sides.

At the time, Red Army front in Stalingrad was reduced to two separate bridgeheads, fighting with the Wolga in their back. But due to the concentration of troops in Stalingrad, the adjacent German front, over a large stretch was rather weak. The goal of the offensive had been to install a defence line along the River Don, protecting the real target of Case Blue, seizing oilfields across the Caucasus, an operation that had meanwhile nearly stalled. Concentrating on Stalingrad had been no part of the original plan.

Apart from the length of the frontline, there were two other weaknesses. During their fast drive east in summer, the 6th Army had often ignored to eliminate pockets of Soviet troops on their side of the Don, leaving the latter useful bridgeheads for a counteroffensive. Secondly, the flanks of the 6th Army were defended by Romanian and Italian troops, which were much less trained, armed and motivated than the Germans. German high command had warned Hitler about this dangerous situation, but he had ignored it, being convinced as he was that the Red Army was finished.

With Operation Uranus, the Red Army easily broke through these weak flanks and encircled the 6th Army. It completely surprised the latter’s commander, General Paulus, who, ironically, found himself and his staff outside of the cauldron. Paulus suggested an immediate breakout, but Hitler ordered him to stay at the Wolga. The encircled army would be supplied by airlift, and a relief force would be sent.

But being encircled meant that 6th Army had to make front on all its sides and hence retreat deeper into the cauldron, lengthening the distance, the relief force would have to make its way. It took three weeks to assemble the relief force, commanded by General Manstein, giving of course the Red Army time to reenforce the encirclement.

Manstein’s offensive started with a difficult choice! Taking the shortest route seemed logic, but that meant he would have to cross the River Don. To avoid that, he had to start from no less than 100 km further away from Stalingrad. He choose the latter option. Initially, he advanced swiftly. The encircled troops heard (and saw at night) the rumble of the relief force nearing. But at the end of December, it became clear for Manstein, that he was running out of means, against a stronger force, and he would not make it. He had meanwhile approached the cauldron only 45 kilometers. So, Manstein suggested Paulus to ignore Hitler’s orders, and try to break out from the encirclement, to make contact with the relief force.

Now Paulus had a dilemma, he considered, and concluded that a), he had only resources and fuel for some 15 kilometers, so he feared to end up in the open plains, amidst the harsh Russian winter; b) while inside Stalingrad, the ruins offered at least some protection against the weather; c) he would have to abandon positions that had cost a high sacrifice to capture them, and d) he would have to abandon the wounded. So Paulus said it could not be done. Manstein then turned to Hitler, who did not veto the proposal, but consulted Paulus, who repeated he did not have the resources for a 45 km breakout. So, Hitler informed Manstein that 6th Army was not capable to put up a breakout. Manstein was soon forced to retire.

Meanwhile, the promised airlift never managed to supply the needs of the encircled army. Nevertheless, the 6th Army, despite starvation, cold and disease, kept on fighting, a resistance that allowed the troops from the also failed Caucasus campaign, to retire safely during January. On January 31st 1943, 6th Army surrendered.
I love your essays on this subject. Very in depth and educational, and is refreshing my memory of old studies.
Part of Hitler's decision making errors were fed by Goering who, and not for the first time, made promises that the Luftwaffe could not keep. They simply didn't have the airborne logistics capability required to supply and entire army group, especially in brutal winter conditions.
 
I love your essays on this subject. Very in depth and educational, and is refreshing my memory of old studies.
Part of Hitler's decision making errors were fed by Goering who, and not for the first time, made promises that the Luftwaffe could not keep. They simply didn't have the airborne logistics capability required to supply and entire army group, especially in brutal winter conditions.
Thanks for liking it! :)
It is true, Goring boasted that the Luftwaffe could supply the encircled 6th Army, but that is exactly what Hitler wanted to hear. The transport planes had to run a gauntlet of Soviet aircraft and anti-aircraft guns. Some 450 were lost in the airlift.

Another 'personal' aspect that influenced decision making, were the ambitions of General Paulus. He was a staff officer, involved in planning Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Paulus hardly had experience in field command, but he took over 6th Army, after its previous commander, Field Marshall Reichenau, was killed in a plan crash. Paulus hoped for himself a high position in the military : succeeding Wilhelm Keitel as head of the Oberkommando Wehrmacht (OKW). Hence his tendecy to be obedient to Hitler's orders (but the last order, to shoot himself, he ignored).
 
Thanks for liking it! :)
It is true, Goring boasted that the Luftwaffe could supply the encircled 6th Army, but that is exactly what Hitler wanted to hear. The transport planes had to run a gauntlet of Soviet aircraft and anti-aircraft guns. Some 450 were lost in the airlift.

Another 'personal' aspect that influenced decision making, were the ambitions of General Paulus. He was a staff officer, involved in planning Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Paulus hardly had experience in field command, but he took over 6th Army, after its previous commander, Field Marshall Reichenau, was killed in a plan crash. Paulus hoped for himself a high position in the military : succeeding Wilhelm Keitel as head of the Oberkommando Wehrmacht (OKW). Hence his tendecy to be obedient to Hitler's orders (but the last order, to shoot himself, he ignored).
After he surrendered, Paulus became part of the NKFD (National Committee for a Free Germany), a Soviet controlled anti-Nazi organization producing propaganda materials. After the war, he settled in East Germany and continued to publish articles and give interviews critical of Hitler and other German generals as well as the West German government and the US. He was willing to kiss any ass that would save his own.
He died in Dresden in 1957. Of the 91,000 Germans captured at Stalingrad, almost half died during the forced march to Siberian prison camps and only 6,000 survived to return home in 1955.
 
After he surrendered, Paulus became part of the NKFD (National Committee for a Free Germany), a Soviet controlled anti-Nazi organization producing propaganda materials. After the war, he settled in East Germany and continued to publish articles and give interviews critical of Hitler and other German generals as well as the West German government and the US. He was willing to kiss any ass that would save his own.
He died in Dresden in 1957. Of the 91,000 Germans captured at Stalingrad, almost half died during the forced march to Siberian prison camps and only 6,000 survived to return home in 1955.
I've also read that Rokossovsky, the ethic Polish general who was one of the major commanders on the Eastern front, was tortured in prison during the '30's purges and only released when it was clear he was needed. He governed Poland after the war, and did exactly what Stalin wanted.
There is also Mark Clark, who served under Alexander in the Italian campaign. After Truscott broke out of the Anzio beachead, he wanted to head straight for the north-south highway and block the German retreat to the north. Clark had other ideas (and apparently Alexander was unwilling to check him)--he wanted to be the liberator of Rome. So he ordered an astounded Truscott to move on Rome immediately. The result was the same as Montgomery's failure to make Antwerp a priority--a large German force escaped to wreak havoc, in northern Italy in the first case and at Market Garden in the second.
These are but a few of many examples where officers put their career aspirations ahead of what was logical. Everybody did it. It is easy to criticize in hindsight, but it is also sometimes valid. Clark was not loved, let us say. Pius XII has also not fared so well in history.
 
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